

Should We Have Faith in the Churches?
Ten-Point Coalition's Effect on Boston's Youth Violence

Jenny Berrien

and

Christopher Winship

Harvard University

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Introduction

After a decade of sharply increased homicide rates, a host of large cities in the U.S. have seen dramatic drops in numbers of homicides during recent years¹. Between 1990 and 1996, the homicide rate dropped 58.7% in New York, 27.9% in Los Angeles, 54.0% in Houston, 15.9% in Washington, D.C., and 17.7% in Philadelphia. (See appendix A for other cities.) In most, if not all of these cities, the reductions have been accompanied by even sharper declines in youth violence. Some other cities, however, have not experienced similar drops in their homicide rates; for example, Baltimore, Phoenix, and Las Vegas have seen rises of 7.5%, 45.3%, and 103.8% respectively. Why has youth violence fallen so significantly in some cities but not in others?

Certainly, part of the decline in youth violence is due to the robust U.S. economy as well as to a drop nationwide in the number of youths ages 15 to 24, the most crime-prone age group. But these factors are present in almost all cities, and thus cannot explain the discrepancy. Similar declines in homicide rates did not occur in the mid- and late 1980s, when the U.S. economy was also strong. Furthermore, the drop in the number of youths ages 15 to 24 -- 7.7% from 1986 to 1996 -- is simply too small to account for much of the change².

The Boston story is similar to that of other cities but is unusual in two important respects. First, the drop in the homicide rate has been the sharpest in the nation. Between 1990 and 1996 the Boston rate dropped 61.2%, from 152 homicides to 59. Since 1996 the rate dropped further to only 43 homicides in 1997 and 35 homicides in 1998,

representing a 77% drop since 1990³. Perhaps even more impressive, for the 29-month period ending in January 1998, Boston had no teenage homicide victims. Since that time there have been four.

Second, Boston is unusual in that a group of ministers, the Ten-Point Coalition, is credited with playing a key role in reducing youth homicides⁴. As far as we are aware, ministers have not been singled out as serving an important role in any other city where there has been a similarly sharp decline in homicides. Further, it is noteworthy that the core of the Ten-Point Coalition consists of only three ministers, Reverends Eugene Rivers, Raymond Hammond, and Jeffrey Brown. Each of them has had substantial additional commitments: Reverends Hammond and Brown head churches with hundreds of members; all three ministers are involved in other programs not related to youth violence, and have frequent local and national speaking engagements. As a result, although they have made substantial individual commitments to reducing violence, the total number of man-hours that the ministers have devoted to the cause is quite modest.

This paper addresses the question of whether or not the Ten-Point Coalition has in fact played a significant role in the reduction of youth violence in Boston. At a prima facie level, the answer would appear to be no. Crime rates have dropped dramatically in other cities without significant involvement from the clergy. Additionally, only three ministers have been centrally involved and even they have not been able to devote full time to the reduction of youth violence. It would seem that the churches' activities have been too

limited to have played a substantial role in the observed changes. Finally, David Kennedy⁵, a researcher at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, has documented in several articles how new police and probation policies and practices, and new cooperative relationships between those two departments, have led to more effective procedures for dealing with youth violence. These changes have been part of a broad-based move towards community policing in Boston. Similar efforts have taken place in other cities as well. The assertion by many people that the Ten-Point Coalition has been a significant facet of the effort would seem at best to be good politics and public relations⁶.

Our analysis has several goals. First and most important, we want to establish that despite the above observations, the Ten-Point Coalition has been critical to the reduction of youth violence in Boston. We plan to conduct the further research needed to firmly establish the validity of this claim.

Second, we will analyze why it has been difficult for police departments to effectively reduce violence. Certainly racial conflict is a problem that must be considered when assessing violence reduction tactics in many cities. We will argue more generally, that any police action in the inner city is inherently problematic. The decision of whether or not to imprison a youth who is in serious trouble is a terrible choice for anyone to make: either the community is left vulnerable to the youth's potentially violent tendencies, or one of the community's own children loses his freedom. The lack of any intermediary institution in the inner city to ensure that such decisions are made in a fair and just way is

an enormous problem. As a result, it has been nearly impossible in many places to reach a consensus as to what constitutes legitimate and constructive police activity.

Our third goal is to suggest what types of policies are likely to be effective in reducing youth violence in the inner city over the long run. Although many cities have successfully reduced youth violence, in some and perhaps in many cases they have accomplished this by pursuing costly, heavy-handed strategies that essentially amount to frisking and intimidating every minority male found on the streets. Besides the ethical and cost-efficiency problems with these policies, our conjecture is that such strategies will not be sustainable over the long term as inner city residents find that the resulting sacrifice of civil liberties is simply too great.

Our analysis has multiple parts. Our key assumption is that the principal barrier to reducing youth violence in the inner city over the long run, is the hostile and highly confrontational relationship that exists in many cities between the police (and other agents of the judicial system) and the inner city community. This hostility is well documented by Randall Kennedy (1997) in the first chapter of his book, *Race, Crime and the Law*. We argue that the embattled relations between police and the community have made it nearly impossible to devise legitimate and effective long-term solutions to youth violence.

The second component of our argument is that many cities (including Boston in the past), pursue an approach that is likely to succeed over the short run, but not over the long term. Many inner city communities have become so frustrated by the high levels of

violence they have had to live with, that they are now willing to accept quite aggressive and oppressive tactics by the police. Because they may produce immediate results, these tactics can be successful in the short run, but eventually there is likely to be a community backlash. This is what happened during an earlier time in Boston. Below, we discuss New York, which like Boston has received considerable media attention.

A third component of our argument is that the key contribution of Ten-Point and efforts by other church based groups does not lie in their outreach and programmatic work with at-risk youth. (Although important, there has been simply too little of it to account for the incredible drops in the homicide rates observed in Boston; similar efforts in the past have had only modest success.⁷) Rather, it is that Ten-Point has changed the way the police (and other elements of the criminal justice system) and Boston's inner city community relate to each other. They have done so by becoming an intermediary institution between the two parties. They have been able to create a balance between the community's desire for safe streets and its reluctance to see its children put in jail. In doing so, they have created what we term an "umbrella of legitimacy" for police to work under.

The fourth and final component of our argument is that the activities of the Ten-Point Coalition have complemented changes in police policy and practice. Ten-Point activities have increased police effectiveness by helping identify those youth that are the greatest threat to the community. In essence, key members of the Ten-Point Coalition

have filled a remote surveillance capacity that significantly benefits the Police Department's overall efficiency. In addition, Ten-Point has acted to legitimate police activities, first through a process of informal oversight and second, by making it clear to the community that they are willing to go to the press when they believe the actions of the police go beyond what the community should tolerate.

To avoid painting an overly rosy picture of Boston, we acknowledge that relationships between the police and the community, especially its youth, are far from completely harmonious. Much of the transformation that has taken place has involved special units of the police department that are especially sensitive to community needs and sentiments. The typical "beat" cop has not been part of this reformation. In many cases street level patrol officers are continuing to pursue the aggressive stop and frisk policies of old. Only time will tell whether their behavior will change, or whether it will instead undermine the legitimacy of the coalition that has been built between police and Ten-Point.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We start by telling the Boston story from the point just prior to Ten-Point's involvement up until the present; this narrative constitutes our data. Next we provide our analysis. We start by examining why the justice system (police, probation, courts) has failed to operate effectively within many inner cities. As noted above, we believe that this is the result of the hostility and distrust that exist between police and inner city residents, and the community's consequent

perception of police activity as illegitimate. We then briefly examine New York, a city where ministers have not played a significant role in reducing crime. We argue that although New York has been nearly as successful as Boston in reducing violence, it has done this by pursuing very aggressive tactics, and signs of a backlash are already surfacing within certain communities. In the following section we examine the basis for the argument that Ten-Point has made a significant contribution to the reduction of youth violence in Boston. As mentioned above, our argument is that Ten-Point has become an intermediary institution between the police and community and in this role they have been able to adjudicate between conflicting goals, focus police efforts, and provide legitimacy for appropriate police activities. Then we consider how to test our argument. Boston's earlier history serves as a control case. The success or failure of other cities in maintaining low levels of youth violence over the long run will provide future tests of our argument. Finally, we discuss in detail an important case that occurred in Boston, the McLaughlin murder, the details of which we were not aware of until after we had first presented our theory. This case provides confirmation for our interpretation of the Boston story.

The Boston Story

Guns and Drugs. Although Boston has never been considered a violence-plagued city to the same extent as Los Angeles or New York, in 1990 a record-breaking 152⁸ homicides stunned Boston with the realization that it had a serious violence problem. The

roots of this violence took hold with the introduction of crack-cocaine into Boston's inner city in 1988, relatively late in comparison to other major U.S. cities. As the crack market developed, so did turf-based gangs. When they realized how much money they could acquire through crack sales, gangs became increasingly protective of turf divisions. Gang colors and geographically-based gang names such as "Corbett Street Posse" all showed evidence of family-type loyalty and respect.

Rival gangs turned to firearms to protect and defend their turf and gang identity. One gang's disrespect of, or show of aggression towards another would inevitably be followed by retaliatory attacks. The extent of gang ties and turf delineation often led individuals who formerly avoided the temptation of gangs and the drug trade to pursue membership for protection and camaraderie. With firearms serving as the primary means of aggression, the level of violence grew to a rate and severity never before seen in the Boston area.

Tipping Kids Upside Down. Because Boston law enforcement agencies had little experience with turf-based violence and criminal gang activity, their initial response to the situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s was disorganized. Until 1990, a department-based policy directed police officers and administration to publicly deny the existence of a "gang problem." Many current Boston police officers vouched for the fact that the department truly had no policy for dealing with the problem of violence in certain Boston neighborhoods in the late 1980s. Rather than creating a plan of attack to address

the specific characteristics of gang-related violence, the police engaged in a fall-back to the aggressive riot-oriented tactics of the 1960s. In addition, because homicide traditionally has been handled on an individual case basis, the police department became primarily focused on making the “big hit” and arresting the “big player,” rather than addressing the significance of the group-based quality of gang violence.

In 1988, the City Wide Anti-Crime Unit (CWACU), traditionally responsible for providing intense, targeted support across district boundaries of the city, was permanently assigned to the most violent neighborhoods of Boston’s inner city. In 1989, the Police Department issued a policy statement that any individual involved in a gang would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Thus the department finally acknowledged the existence of a “gang problem.” According to one current police captain, the CWACU was expected to “go in, kick butts, and crack heads” and adopted a mentality that “they could do anything to these kids” in order to put an end to their violent activity. This mentality resulted in highly aggressive and reportedly indiscriminate policing tactics.

Community Backlash. Two events in 1989, the Carol Stuart murder investigation and the Stop and Frisk scandal, focused community attention on the Police Department’s initial approach to the violence crisis. Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman, was murdered in the primarily African-American neighborhood of Boston’s Mission Hill. Her husband, Charles Stuart, who was with her at the time of her death, reported that a black male committed the crime. Relying on Charles Stuart’s account, the

Boston Police Department “blanketed” the Mission Hill neighborhood looking for suspects. There were widespread reports of police abuse as well as coerced statements that implicated a black male suspect, William Bennet. Charles Stuart himself was later identified as the alleged perpetrator of the crime, but committed suicide before an investigation could be completed. The Boston Police Department’s unquestioning acceptance of Charles Stuart’s story about a black assailant, and subsequent mishandling of the murder investigation, created an atmosphere of extreme distrust of the Department within Boston’s African-American community.

This community suspicion was further intensified by the Stop and Frisk scandal, which also occurred in 1989. A public statement by a precinct commander that labeled the then-current police approach to gang-related violence as a “stop and frisk” campaign shocked the community and solidified the public’s suspicion of the Boston Police Department. There is some dissension within the police department about the extent to which their policy was to indiscriminately stop and frisk all black males within high crime areas, a policy known as “tipping kids upside down.” According to several officers, they targeted individuals who either were previously spotted performing some illegal activity or were known gang members. However, officers also acknowledged that this approach was critically flawed because it was often very difficult to “distinguish the good guys from the bad guys.” In addition, current members of the police force agree that there were “bad seed” cops who acted far too aggressively and indiscriminately. Accusations of stop and

frisk tactics led to a court case in the fall of 1989 in which a judge threw out evidence acquired in what he viewed as an instance of unconstitutional search and seizure.

As a result of the Stuart case and the Stop and Frisk scandal, the CWACU was disbanded in 1990. The Department, however, began to see significant rewards from their aggressive street policies as Boston's homicide rates fell from 103 in 1991 to 73 in 1992⁹. This drop reinforced belief in the efficacy of their heavy-handed tactics. The police continued to view their actions as simple compliance with departmental orders. Despite this success, however, most officers acknowledged that the department's aggressive actions during this time brought community mistrust to an extreme level.

These two scandals, combined with smaller-scale, less visible incidents, eventually led the Boston press to question the Police Department's capacity to effectively handle even basic policing activities. In 1991, the Boston Globe published a harshly critical four-part series called "Bungling the Basics,"¹⁰ that detailed a succession of foul-ups by the Boston Police Department during the previous few years. Subsequent stories reported serious failings in the Department's Internal Affairs Division. Misguided investigations, problematic policing and bad press eventually led to the appointment of the St. Clair Commission to conduct a thorough review of Boston Police Department and its policies.

At this point, the Boston Police Department was in desperate need of an overhaul in order to deal with all the negative publicity. Steps were taken to publicly exhibit a changeover in law enforcement policy in Boston. "Bad-seed" cops were weeded out. The

disbanded CWACU was reorganized into a new unit, the Anti-Gang Violence Unit (AGVU), which took a “softer” approach. The aggressive and indiscriminate, but effective street tactics of the past were sharply curtailed. Apparently as a result, the decrease in homicides during 1991 and 1992 were followed by a sharp increase in 1993¹¹.

The St. Clair Report, released in 1992 after a year-long investigation, cited major corruption within the department and recommended major changes. In 1993, Mayor Flynn resigned, and Bill Bratton from the New York Police Department replaced Police Commissioner Mickey Roache.

Innovation in Police Practices. Bratton brought a new philosophy and a commitment to innovation to the Boston Police Department. Fundamental shifts occurred in its overall operations. According to current police officers, the neighborhood policing tactics, that formerly “just existed on paper” and had never been implemented under Police Commissioner Roache, were actively pursued under Commissioner Bratton. Many officers also agreed that the new administration was simply more open-minded and willing to break away from the institutionally embedded policing practices.

Street-level officers had learned from their constant exposure to the complexities of gang-related violence. They realized the need for innovative law enforcement strategies to address the current problem specifically and intelligently. The newly organized Anti-Gang Violence Unit looked for new ways of managing gang activities. First, they realized the need for community support and thus were determined to exhibit “squeaky-clean”

policing strategies. Previous strategies had also failed to include collaboration with other agencies, so the AGVU began to pursue an increasingly multi-agency approach to combat youth violence. In 1993, the AGVU was changed to the Youth Violence Strike Force, retaining the same key members¹².

Other agencies within Boston's law enforcement network were concurrently revamping their activities. Certain individuals within the probation department in particular became quite disillusioned with the "paper-shuffling" nature of their job. Fearful of the extreme levels of violence in certain Boston districts, probation officers had completely abandoned street presence and home visits. Consequently, there was no enforcement of probation terms such as curfew, area, and activity restrictions. Without enforcement of probation restrictions, a term on probation became viewed as a "slap on the wrist" within the law enforcement community and was essentially ineffectual in combating youth violence.

A few probation officers began to respond to this crisis of ineffectiveness and took strong, proactive measures to readjust their approach. Informal conversations between probation officers and police officers who regularly attended hearings at Dorchester District Court led to an experimental effort in agency collaboration. A strategy labeled "Operation Night Light" was developed that enabled probation officers to resume the enforcement component of their job.

On the first outing of the Night Light team, three probation officers and two police

officers went out in a patrol car on the night of November 12, 1992. With the protection of their police companions, probation officers were able to venture out after dark and enforce the conditions placed on their probationers. Youths began to realize that they could no longer blatantly disregard the terms of their probation because their PO might be out on the streets, at their house, or at their hangouts after curfew to check on them. Probation violations would have repercussions, such as lengthened probation sentence, stricter probation terms, or ultimately time in jail. Operation Night Light eventually became an institutionalized practice of Boston law enforcement agencies¹³ that has been heavily praised by policy experts and the media across the country.

Inter-agency collaboration to address the issue of youth violence has become standard practice in Boston. Participation of policy researchers (primarily David Kennedy and his associates at the John F. Kennedy School of Government) also served a vital role in bringing about the fundamental overhaul of Boston's policing strategies. The Boston Gun Project, begun in 1995, was a three-year effort that brought together a wide range of agencies including the Police Department, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Probation Department, Boston School Police, Suffolk County District Attorney, and many others to address youth violence¹⁴.

The Boston Gun Project was innovative, not only for its collaborative nature, but also because it utilized research-based information to address the youth violence problem from a new angle. The Gun Project coalition was able to attack the problem at the supply

side by cracking down on dealers of illicit firearms. On the demand side, Gun Project research led to the specific targeting of 1300 individuals who represented less than 1% of their age group citywide but were responsible for at least 60% of the city's homicides¹⁵.

This type of inter-agency collaboration helped implement a variety of additional innovative strategies. In 1994, "Operation Scrap Iron" was initiated to target people who were illegally transporting firearms into Boston. Gun trafficking within certain areas of the city was shut down. Additionally, "area warrant sweeps" were used to target dangerous areas. For example, police would arrest all outstanding warrants within a particular housing project. Multi-agency teams of youth and street workers then came in to provide follow-up once police presence subsided. As one police officer noted, these strategies made sure that "everyone was involved and brought something to the table. Everyone had a piece of the pie and, therefore, would get the benefits"¹⁶. Even more impressive is that, according to this same police officer, not one civilian complaint was filed in response to the warrant sweep tactic.

In May of 1996, this collaboration culminated in Operation Cease-Fire. Operation Cease-Fire fully institutionalized inter-agency collaboration among Boston's crime-fighting agencies -- Police, Probation, Department of Youth Services, Street Workers, special agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and others (mentioned in reference to the Boston Gun Project). Key community members, primarily from faith-based organizations, were also involved.

These groups work together to identify gangs responsible for violence in specific hot spots around the city. Subsequently the group executes a forceful intervention by developing “zero tolerance” enforcement within the specific targeted area and sending an explicit message to gang members themselves that violence will no longer be tolerated.

Community-based Change. Individuals within Boston’s religious community were some of the most vocal and publicized critics of the Police Department’s aggressive tactics during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Reverend Eugene Rivers, in particular, became a controversial figure in the media during these years because of his harsh criticism of both local law enforcement agencies and the city’s black leaders. Remarkably, these same religious leaders later became active participants in law enforcement agency strategies such as Operation Cease-Fire. This turnaround suggests that the Boston Police Department has been effective in improving community relations. It is also likely that Boston’s faith-based leaders experienced a shift in their own attitudes toward the police.

Boston’s faith-based organizations did not begin working together as a group until 1992. Until then, most African-American clergy leaders in Boston had been following separate agendas. Their activities did not generally involve much street-oriented action to address youth violence within their communities. Although Reverend Rivers was on the street establishing strong outreach to gang members and other community youth, his constant criticism of other clergy leaders made his effort a partnerless endeavor.

A tragic event in May 1992 finally spurred collaborative action within Boston’s

African-American clergy. Violence broke out among gang members attending a funeral for a youth murdered in a drive-by shooting. The shootout and multiple stabbing in the Morning Star Baptist Church threw the service and the congregation into chaos.

The brazenness of this attack, taking place within a church sanctuary, inspired many of Boston's black clergy to take action. They realized that they could no longer effectively serve their community by remaining within the four walls of their churches and ignoring the situation on the street. Instead, youth and others in the surrounding troubled neighborhoods needed to become extensions of the church congregations.

This incident led to the founding of The Ten-Point Coalition, a group of some forty churches, with Reverends Ray Hammond, Eugene Rivers, and Jeffrey Brown as key leaders.¹⁷ A "Ten-Point Proposal for Citywide Mobilization to Combat the Material and Spiritual Sources of Black-on-Black Violence"¹⁸ was drawn up and published as a call to churches to participate in the effort to address the violence crisis in their communities. The creation of the Ten-Point Coalition represented a major step towards active collaboration within Boston's African-American religious community.

As of 1992, however, the relations between the African-American community leaders and Boston's law enforcement agencies were still very strained and often antagonistic. Reverend Rivers was constantly "in the face" of Boston law enforcement and was viewed as a "cop basher" in police circles. He established a constant presence in the troubled streets of Dorchester and made repeated contact with the same kids as the

Anti-Gang Violence Unit. As an aggressive advocate for local youth, both in and out of the courts, Rivers had many confrontations with AGVU and other patrol officers.

Eventually this antagonism subsided and was replaced with effective collaboration¹⁹. The turnaround resulted from a combination of influential events and the strong effort made by key law enforcement officials to show that the Boston Police Department had a new attitude. In 1991 shots were fired into Reverend Rivers' home in Four Corners, one of the most violent areas of Dorchester, making him painfully aware of the dangers of carrying out a solitary campaign against youth violence. He has acknowledged that seeing the lives of his wife and children placed in jeopardy caused a shift in his attitude. He became more open to the possibility of allying with both other ministers and individuals in the law enforcement community.

When Reverend Rivers and other key clergy members such as Ray Hammond and Jeffrey Brown formed the Ten-Point Coalition in 1992, their public stature and media influence increased. They wielded their power effectively for the purpose of maintaining a check on police practices in Boston. In 1992, the Ten-Point Coalition partnered with another community based organization, the Police Practices Coalition to establish an organized, community-based police monitoring group.

The Ten-Point Coalition, and especially Reverend Rivers, had habitually criticized the Boston Police Department. Increasingly positive interactions with individual officers, however, began to convince the clergy group that the Department could change their

their behavior. The ministers acknowledged the Department's progress in an awards ceremony called the "People's Tribunal," initiated in 1992 to publicly honor "good cops." These positive steps eventually led to collaborative efforts like the previously mentioned Operation Cease-Fire. Cooperation among law enforcement agencies and clergy leaders, as well as various community-based groups, has continued to evolve and expand during recent years.

Current Relations. Currently, there is extensive inter-agency and community-based collaboration in Boston. A primary venue for this work is the Bloods and Crips Initiative. It was established in spring 1998 as an aggressive street-level mobilization of lay and pastoral workers to intervene in and prevent youth involvement in Bloods, Crips, or any other gang activity. By combining the effort of a wide range of agency representatives, the Initiative aims to approach the problem comprehensively.

Boston Police, Boston Probation, Department of Youth Services, clergy members, city Street and Youth Workers, Mass Bay Transit Authority Police, the School Department, and School Police meet weekly to share information on important developments on the street. For example, several disturbing incidents of sexual assault and harassment have occurred recently on the city's public transportation system. MBTA Police and city youth workers as well as clergy brought up the importance of addressing these incidents at the weekly Bloods and Crips Initiative meetings. A task force on sexual harassment and assault was established in order to address these issues effectively. School

presentations on the subject are planned in the future.

Another objective of this collaboration is to exhibit strong, supportive and unified authority to the targeted youth. This is achieved through the participation of multiple agencies and clergy representatives in all of the initiative's activities: school visits and presentations, home visits to youth suspected of gang involvement, regular street patrols, and strong presence in popular "hang-out" areas during peak hours. The collaborative approach serves to notify youth of alternative options and brings them into contact with a network of resources designed to serve their specific needs.

More informal cooperation among the wide array of agencies and community groups participating in operations such as the Bloods and Crips Initiative plays an important role in achieving quick responses to tense situations, and effective distribution of resources to problematic "hot-spots" in the city. Recently, for example, a particular youth repeatedly instigated dangerous confrontations in Dorchester -- holding a gun to another youth's head; firing shots in the air in the midst of young "trick-or-treaters" on Halloween night, shooting holes in parked cars -- all within a period of a couple of weeks. Each incident had the potential to aggravate pre-existing tensions among various neighborhood "crews" and destroy any sense of community security. Because of this risk, Reverend Rivers utilized his connections with law enforcement to ensure a quick and effective handling of the situation.

In this case, "handling" the situation meant getting the individual off the street, for

a long time. At the weekly Bloods and Crips Initiative meeting, Reverend Rivers identified this particular youth and made law enforcement officials aware of his threat to peace in the neighborhood. Rivers and a youth worker also spoke with the youth personally to explain to him why he was being targeted. The youth was arrested and the “noise” he was causing in the community was quieted. Clergy leaders and law enforcement officials have thus achieved an uncommon level of collaborative action in Boston.

The Judicial System and the Inner City

Why have police departments and judicial systems been unable to deal with past or current youth violence in so many cities? Observers have pointed out that inner-city communities in America’s major cities often see themselves as at war with the local police and the local government. The police are frequently compared to an occupying military force. The reasons for this perception are well known. While the Rodney King beating in L.A. is the most publicized incident, almost every major city has its own horror stories of police brutality. In Boston the most recent case was the Cox case in January of 1995. Michael Cox, a black undercover policeman, was brutally beaten by four uniformed policemen who mistook him for a suspect. In the same year, police mistakenly broke into the home of Accelynne Williams, a retired black minister, during a drug bust. Williams died of a heart attack as a result of the forced entry. We have already discussed the Stuart case and the “stop and frisk” scandal as additional instances of alleged racially biased and

overly aggressive policing tactics.

As disturbing as these incidents are, the response of inner city residents has been nearly as troubling. Although inner city residents are disproportionately the victims of crime (crimes often committed by their fellow residents), they have become increasingly unwilling to cooperate with police or support police activities. In his book, *Race, Crime, and the Law*, Randall Kennedy²⁰ describes this growing alienation of black inner city residents from the criminal justice system. Kennedy points to the sources of this problem in the South and the lynchings of blacks. He quotes from Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 book, *American Dilemma*:

The Negroes... are hurt in their trust that the law is impartial, that the court and the police are their protection, and indeed, that they belong to an orderly society which has set up this machinery for common security and welfare. They will not feel confidence in, and loyalty toward a legal order which is entirely out of their control and which they see to be inequitable and merely part of the system of caste oppression. Solidarity then develops easily in the Negro group, a solidarity against the law and the police. The arrested Negro often acquires the prestige of a victim, a martyr, or a hero, even when he is simply a criminal.

Kennedy then goes on to explain how this same dynamic is currently at work:

It largely explains why many blacks rallied around the gang of boys who raped a white jogger in New York's Central Park, around Marion Barry, the mayor of Washington,

D.C., who was caught red-handed smoking cocaine, around Alcee Hastings, the federal district court judge who, based on allegations of corruption, was ousted from office by the U.S. Senate (only to be subsequently elected to the House of Representatives), around Damian Williams and the other hooligans who gained notoriety when they were filmed beating a hapless white truck driver (Reginald Denny) in the early hours of the Los Angeles riot of 1992, and around Mike Tyson, the boxing Champion, when he was imprisoned for rape.

And the examples go on. Kennedy then describes how the black criminal has been glorified in the movies and through gangster rap and records such as “Cop Killer.” His point is that excesses of the judicial system, both past and present, have led inner city minorities to see the criminal justice system as totally lacking legitimacy and, in the extreme, led them to treat criminals as political dissidents and martyrs.

In recent years this has led to a growing phenomenon know as jury nullification -- decisions by minority juries to acquit defendants who are clearly guilty. The Marion Barry and Damian Williams cases noted above are both examples. In his book, Randall Kennedy discusses and critiques the arguments for jury nullification by Paul Butler, professor of law at George Washington University and a former federal prosecutor. In a *Yale Law Journal*²¹ article, Butler argues that jury nullification is justified for three reasons: (1) there are cases when the acquittal of a guilty defendant is laudable; (2) America has so grossly failed to keep its promises to blacks that there is no reason that blacks are obliged to

uphold the law; (3) white racism is the cause of most black criminality. Butler further argues that, “The decision as to what kind of conduct by African-Americans ought to be punished is better made by African-Americans themselves based on the costs and benefits to their community, than by the traditional criminal justice process.”

If Randall Kennedy’s portrayal of minority attitudes toward police and the judicial system is even moderately accurate, as we believe it is, it should not be surprising that police have found it difficult to deal with youth violence in our inner cities. When police expect no cooperation from residents, they tend to choose aggressive broad-based tactics that only further alienate community residents. The inner city community sees little legitimacy in these tactics, and the negative publicity they receive undermines their political sustainability. By alienating inner city residents, the police also lose their best potential source of community surveillance.

Why are the relationships between police and inner city residents in such a sorry state? Kennedy’s book discusses how the current situation has its roots in America’s history of racism. He contends that although considerable improvements are needed in our justice system, much progress has also been made. Certainly, the tense and often dangerous conditions that police have to work in make it difficult for police to handle potentially explosive situations in a sensitive manner.

We would like to suggest an additional reason. Inner city residents have conflicting goals. On the one hand, like all Americans they want safe neighborhoods. On

the other hand, they do not like seeing young men from their communities put in jail. As Glenn Loury has noted (as quoted in Kennedy), “the young black men wreaking havoc in the ghetto are still ‘our youngsters’ in the eyes of many of the decent poor and working class black people who are often their victims.” Given these two conflicting desiderata, making decisions about whether a particular youth should be arrested or jailed is difficult. Allow him to remain in the community and perhaps endanger other neighborhood residents? Or send him to jail, depriving him of his freedom and removing yet another young male from the community? Neither option is appealing for members of the community. Parents, neighbors, and other residents are likely to disagree sharply, and a decision-making process that would be widely perceived as fair may be unattainable.

A recent situation within a Boston housing project demonstrates some of the problems inner-city residents face in “policing their own.”²² In the 1970s Mildred Hailey founded a movement that would spread nation-wide, to make public housing tenants the managers of their own projects. Hailey gained control of her project, Bromley-Heath in Boston, and completely turned it around, thereby making herself a “national emblem of self-help.”²³

Despite Hailey’s success and national acclaim, she has recently come under fire for placing community ties ahead of her professional responsibilities. In October 1998, federal agents carried out a massive drug bust at Bromley-Heath, and two of Hailey’s grandsons were among the 39 people accused of dealing crack at the project. Three other

people identified in the bust were relatives of other board members.

It was alleged that board members “turned a blind eye” to drug dealing, especially when perpetrated by their own relatives, and that they had corrupt financial dealings with these same relatives. The privately employed Bromley-Heath police force have said that the tenant board told them to “keep Boston police out of the project and keep our young black youths out of jail.”²⁴ Due to these allegations of corruption, mismanagement and favoritism, Hailey was suspended from her position as executive director of Bromley-Heath and the Boston Housing Authority reclaimed control of the housing project. This example illustrates how difficult it can be to adjudicate between the competing goals of safe streets and keeping one’s children out of jail.

Most inner cities simply do not have institutions that are capable of dealing with these questions in a way that would be perceived as just by both the local residents and the society at large. The police, in addition to their history of racism, are biased in favor of safe streets—by any means necessary. Social workers, street workers, and community organizers typically are sympathetic to the kids. Residents themselves are likely to differ depending on who is in trouble and their relationship to them.

We will argue that in Boston, the ministers of the Ten-Point Coalition have become an intermediary institution through which decisions are made that are perceived as fair. Through their involvement with at-risk youth and their intervention in situations where youth are in trouble, they have gained the legitimacy to inject a sense of justice into the

situation. They have created what we call an umbrella of legitimacy for police to work under. The police are sheltered from broad public criticism while engaged in certain activities that are deemed by ministers of the Ten-Point Coalition to be in the interest of the community and its youth. However, indiscriminate or abusive police tactics that are deemed outside the umbrella will be publicly attacked.

The Heavy-Handed Approach: New York

As the history of Boston in the early 1990s has shown, it is possible to successfully address youth violence through aggressive, broad-based police tactics, but community criticism eventually caused the Department to abandon these tactics. New York has also dramatically reduced its homicide rate in recent years (by 56.1% between 1990 and 1996) and like Boston, has received considerable national media attention for doing so. However, its highly aggressive police practices are beginning to spark a community backlash. Growing community dissatisfaction with the heavy-handed policy may make the current tactics unsustainable²⁵.

Crime reduction emerged as a central issue on the agenda of New York's Mayor Giuliani. His campaign to crack down on "quality of life" violations coupled with aggressive attacks on violence and the drug market has gained national attention. Significant increases in money and manpower have facilitated the implementation of various labor-intensive, aggressive strategies to suppress violence.

One example is a program to create "model blocks" throughout the city. The police

first implement an “all-out drug sweep,” then create “checkpoints at both ends of the street, post officers there around the clock, paint over graffiti and help residents organize tenant groups and a block association”²⁶. Twenty-four hour patrols are implemented as a follow-up strategy once the blocks achieve “model” status--meaning that crime has been sufficiently shutdown in that particular block.

For some people, the potentially oppressive nature of this type of strategy is justified by its demonstrated success. A *New York Times* article reported the achievements of the model block strategy in Washington Heights, a 250-block area that became the “nation’s largest wholesale drug market” with the introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s. Four “model blocks” have been created within this neighborhood, “And slowly, the fear has begun to lift on 163rd Street. People who for years would only leave their apartments in a hurry have begun to step outside merely to be outside--first by peering out of a doorway, then by taking a seat on a stoop, then finally taking the plunge by striking up a conversation with a stranger next door”²⁷. For some community residents, the relief of escaping self-imprisonment and fear justifies any means necessary to achieve it. The community response, as well as the positive shift in homicide statistics, speaks well for New York’s tough strategy.

These aggressive policing strategies are often credited with bringing about the dramatic drop exhibited in New York’s homicide statistics, “‘New York has enjoyed a significant drop in crime that can’t be easily explained by sociological factors,’ said Mark

H. Moore, a criminologist at Harvard University. ‘Therefore, the claim that this might be the result of police activity looks pretty good.’”²⁸ However, the tactics are often controversial because of their heavy-handedness: “The frisking of low-level offenders has been sharply criticized by some civil libertarians and is one reason for a two-year jump in abuse complaints”²⁹.

Public gratitude for the city’s crackdown on crime is balanced by an equally with anxiety about the high level of police presence in their neighborhoods. The familiar, routine presence of drugs and gangs is sometimes viewed as the lesser of two evils when compared to the oppressive and aggressive actions of the police, “Many more (African-American individuals) would associate themselves with demands for law and order if they did not fear racially prejudiced misconduct by law enforcement officials”³⁰.

Due to Giuliani’s heavy-handed policies, New York’s crime rate successes have not led to improved relations between the inner city community and the police. According to the *New York Times* report on model blocks in Washington Heights cited above,

Wary of one another, people hardly put their faith in the police. Tensions between the two have been worse in Washington Heights than anywhere else in the city, from the full fledged riots that followed a police officer’s fatal shooting of an unarmed man in 1992, to the April 1997 death of Kevin Cedeno, shot in the back by an officer who was named “cop of the month” by his colleagues soon after. “At least the drug dealers are not here to hurt you-they’re here to make a profit,” said Yvonne Stennett,

who heads the Community League of West 159th Street... increasingly aggressive police tactics have convinced many law-abiding residents that officers see them as criminal suspects first.³¹

African-American community leaders throughout the city have echoed these complaints.

In May 1998 the Reverend Calvin O. Butts III, a prominent Baptist minister from Harlem, went so far as to call Mayor Giuliani a “racist who is on the verge of creating a fascist state in New York City.”³² Butt’s harsh criticism was reportedly “something bubbling up” for a long time, but was triggered by the city’s layoff of 600 workers from Harlem Hospital.³³ Leaders in the black community viewed this move as just another action reflecting the city government’s unfair targeting of poor minority communities. Although some of the city’s black leaders did not condone Butts’ labeling of the Mayor as a racist, they often echoed his complaints regarding Giuliani’s treatment of the black community. “Several prominent blacks have used confrontational language to criticize policies they asserted were harmful to their community; both Mr. Sharpton and David N. Dinkins, the former Mayor, said that they have been leveling essentially the same charges against the Giuliani administration for years.”³⁴ Community outcry against overly aggressive and racially biased policing tactics has been fueled by well-publicized cases of police brutality and corruption.

In 1997 a now infamous group of police officers in the New York 30th Precinct in Harlem, known as “Nannery’s Raiders” in honor of their Sargeant, was indicted for an

extreme example of corruption: breaking into apartments to steal cash and drugs which they either used or sold³⁵. Also in 1997, four New York police officers were accused of beating and abusing Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, because he was black; they reportedly used racial epithets during the incident³⁶. This past September's "Million Youth March" also brought claims of discriminatory and abusive policing tactics:

Reacting to the violent end to the otherwise peaceful Million Youth March, community leaders, Harlem residents and other New Yorkers yesterday blamed Mayor Rudolph Giuliani for the melee, some accusing him of creating a military siege that might have caused a bloodbath except for the attendees restraint, 'The heroes were the people of Harlem. If they hadn't been as restrained and acted with such courage and dignity, there would have been a carnage,' said author Cornell West. 'They were dealing with a whole process of contempt and disrespect from the Giuliani administration, mediated through the police...' Panelists agreed that it was the police, not march organizer Khallid Abdul Muhammad, who touched off the fracas that broke out around 4 p.m., when the rally was scheduled to end. Police in helicopters buzzed the crowd and officers in riot gear mounted the stage at precisely 4 p.m. the hour which a court order had set for the rally to end.³⁷

Each of these troubling incidents and the ensuing publicity has served to highlight the potential for danger in Giuliani's sanctioning of aggressive policing strategies, and have brought attention to the shocking level of corruption within certain police precincts.

The community response to these incidents indicates great skepticism regarding current policing tactics in New York City. Mayor Giuliani remains a staunch supporter of his Police Department. However, the increasingly expressed sentiment that the city's impressive crime drop does not justify the accompanying loss in civil liberties may eventually force the Mayor to reevaluate his position. The maintenance of current NYPD strategies over the long term may well become impossible.

An Umbrella of Legitimacy

The relationship between the Boston police and the Ten-Point Coalition has gone from hostility to stable cooperation. (Berrien provides a detailed exposition.³⁸) We are planning a companion paper to this one that will analyze how these changes came about. The thesis of this paper is that the cooperative relationship established between the Boston police and Ten-Point has been instrumental in reducing the level of youth violence, in two significant ways. Most importantly, Ten-Point has given increased legitimacy to appropriate police activities within the inner city community. Secondly, the Coalition's community surveillance may have possibly increased police effectiveness.

If one were looking for legitimacy through a relationship, there could perhaps be no better way than through a partnership with a group of ministers. Throughout society ministers have unique moral standing. They are expected to be fair and to protect the interests of the less fortunate. Ministers are often asked to be problem solvers and to

adjudicate between conflicting parties. In the inner city, ministers and their churches are among the last formal institutions committed to the welfare of their neighborhoods.

Within the black community, they have often been looked to for leadership. In the case of Ten-Point, two of the three core ministers live in Boston's inner city, and all three are well known for their extensive work with inner city youth. These factors give Ten-Point considerable credibility to speak for Boston's inner city community³⁹.

The new relationship between the police and Ten-Point is built on a number of implicit understandings, each of which potentially supports legitimate police activity. We discuss five: (1) that youth violence needs to be dealt with as a criminal problem; (2) that some kids need to be jailed both for their own good and the good of the community; (3) that a small number of youth constitute most of the problem and that the ministers will help identify them; (4) that the ministers will have a say in what happens to specific individuals; and (5) that if police use indiscriminate and abusive methods in dealing with youths, the ministers will take the story to the media.

The first assumption is that, although poverty, single-parent households, poor schools, etc. may be factors in youth violence, any effort to reduce violence in the short run needs to treat it as a criminal problem. In the talks that ministers routinely give in schools, they make it clear to the kids that they have two choices. If they go straight, the ministers will help them succeed in school, find jobs, and deal with those kids who are trying to pressure them to stay with the gang. However, if they decide to participate in

gang activities, the ministers will do their utmost to see them put in jail. The ministers emphasize that the last thing they want to do is preside over a kid's funeral. If a kid is going to be involved in a gang, it is safer for him to be in jail than on the street.

Implicit in the "choice" that the ministers provide is a second assumption -- that some kids are so out of control they should be put in jail. It is not apparent that the ministers held this belief initially, and it is clear that the police doubted the ministers' willingness to support the incarceration of some individuals. Interview after interview with both police and ministers indicates that cooperation only became possible once the ministers publicly acknowledged (Reverend Rivers most vocally) that some kids needed to be put away. There was no tacit agreement about what constituted a "sufficiently out of control" kid. Cooperation between law enforcement and the ministers emerged through negotiations over the particular circumstances under which certain kids should be committed. With improved communication and the acknowledgment of a common objective, both parties began working with the same definition of the problem. The primary issue that remained was agreeing on what should be done in particular circumstances.

A third assumption has been the understanding by both police and ministers that only a small number of youths are responsible for most of the violence. As noted above, David Kennedy⁴⁰ place the estimate at 1% of their age group --1300 youths. As Reverend Rivers' actions suggest, it only takes a few kids shooting off guns to terrorize a whole

neighborhood. This is why standard stop and frisk procedures can be so oppressive: for every hundred kids stopped, only one is truly part of the problem. The increased cooperation between the ministers and Boston's law enforcement agencies helped ameliorate this situation. A key part of the agreement is that the ministers will help identify those kids that are the true problems, thereby informally providing remote surveillance for the police⁴¹. This accurate information makes police efforts more effective, and targeting also increases their legitimacy by ensuring that police attention focuses on the right youth with appropriate measures.

A fourth and related assumption is that the ministers would have an informal role in determining how particular individuals would be treated by the judicial system. In some circumstances this means that the ministers contact the police and ask for certain kids to be arrested. Often the ministers also help the police locate them. The ministers will encourage judges to sentence these troubled youths to alternative programs or regular "check-ins" at their churches, rather than time in jail. In other cases, it means that the ministers appear in court to argue either for leniency or for a stiff sentence. An example was related above in which a Reverend Rivers contributed to the arrest of the young man responsible for repeated incidents of violence during Halloween 1998.

These understandings between police and the ministers have created what we term an umbrella of legitimacy for police activity. The ministers have created a context in which police can deal with the problem of youth violence without recrimination from the

press or the community. It is an umbrella, however, that only provides coverage under specific conditions: (1) when police focus on the truly problematic youth; (2) when they deal with these youth in what is perceived as a fair and just way; and (3) when this is done in cooperation with the community through the ministers.

Activities that fall outside these boundaries will be publicly criticized in the media, which is the fifth assumption of this cooperative understanding. The ministers' past criticism of the police in the *Globe* is well remembered. Furthermore, Reverend Rivers, as the most outspoken of the ministers, is known for his willingness to criticize anyone, whether it is the police, the Urban League, or Harvard's Department of Afro-American Studies. The ministers provide informal oversight of police actions. They are able to do this in part because they are ministers, in part because they are community leaders and members, and in part because they exhibited a willingness in the past to be highly critical of the police.

How are we to understand Ten-Point's role within Boston's inner city? In our discussion above, we quoted Myrdal and Butler arguing that blacks need to have more control over the judicial process. The Ten-Point Coalition has gone some if not all of the way toward accomplishing this goal.

Our analysis suggests that Ten-Point has become an intermediary institution between the police and the community. In this role they have been able to adjudicate between the conflicting community goals of having safe streets and keeping their kids out

of prison. They have done this by supporting a police policy in which violent youth are treated as a criminal problem; by supporting the commitment of some youth to prison; by helping police focus on the small number of youth that are the true problem; by working with the judicial system in determining the appropriate outcomes for youth who are in trouble; and finally, by their demonstrated willingness to criticize police behavior that is not in the interest of the community. Through these five activities the Ten-Point Coalition has created an umbrella of legitimacy for appropriate police activity. Activities carried out and decisions made under this umbrella are broadly seen by the community as being fair and just. Those falling outside are brought to the attention of the media. Some youth have been sent to prison; others have been given second chances; and the vast majority are no longer being harassed on the street, or at least not as much as in the past. Because of the Ten-Point Coalition's involvement, the differential treatment of individual youth is more likely to be seen by the community as legitimate. Hard decisions are being made, but they are being made in a manner that is typically viewed as fair and just⁴².

Testing the Argument

We have told a story in which the Ten-Point Coalition played a critical role in reducing youth violence by changing the relationship between the police and community from one of hostility and anger to cooperation. As a result of this cooperation, the police have been able to operate more effectively and with perceived legitimacy. How can our argument be tested?

Three observations are useful. First, the earlier history of Boston serves as a control case for the Ten-Point story. The police, reacting to the influx of crack and guns, pursued a broad, aggressive stop and frisk policy that was initially quite successful (however, see endnote 8 for qualifications on this assertion). Subsequently a community backlash developed, and the police had to substantially pull back from these tactics. Over the long run they were not sustainable without community support.

Second, our theory makes important predictions about what will happen in other cities where police are pursuing heavy-handed policies to reduce youth violence. We have argued that this approach will only work in the long run if there is continued community support. We suspect that in many cities, as in Boston during the early 1990s, the support will be short-lived. Most communities are unlikely to remain tolerant over the long term of a police presence in their neighborhood that resembles an occupying military force. We argued that criticism of current policing policies is beginning to occur in New York.

Third, we found a practical test of our argument in the circumstances of a particular homicide case in Boston. It illustrates how the relationship between police and Ten-Point helped a potentially explosive situation to be handled without incident. We learned about this case only after formulating our theory regarding the importance of current minister/law enforcement interaction in Boston, and therefore, the story of how the city handled this particular situation actually serves as a test for our assertions.

In May of 1998, we made our first public presentation of our analysis of the Ten-

Point story (detailed above) at a two-day meeting in Philadelphia involving police, ministers, and other community actors from Boston and Philadelphia. The purpose was to explore whether the lessons learned in Boston could be useful in Philadelphia. At the end of our presentation, Paul Joyce, one of the key police officers in Boston's Youth Violence Strike Force, spoke up. He said that he fully agreed with our interpretation and he wanted to tell us about a particular murder case that showed that our analysis was correct. We now provide the details of this story.

On September 25, 1995, a white Assistant Attorney General, Paul McLaughlin, was shot and killed on his way home from work. The murder occurred at the commuter rail station in West Roxbury, a predominantly Irish, middle class neighborhood of Boston. McLaughlin was a well-respected prosecutor, dedicated to fighting crime, who had recently headed a task force against gang activities. The murder appeared to be a "hit" in retaliation for his gang work. His assailant was described as a "black male, about 14 or 15 years old, 5 foot 7, wearing a hooded sweat shirt and baggy jeans."⁴³

Once the police issued that description, there was immediate concern because it could easily apply to many young black males. Reportedly, the police released the description "under intense pressure from the news media," but many feared that the public disclosure of such a vague description would reinforce racial and "generational stereotypes" rather than effectively aid the police investigation⁴⁴. Young black men feared being mistaken for the assailant due to their skin color, youth, and manner of dress.

Immediate and reassuring response from both law enforcement officials and community leaders helped abate the potentially divisive nature of this description.

This case also had potentially harmful implications for perceptions of law enforcement officials. Many feared that the authority of Boston law enforcement officials could be severely damaged if the case was not handled firmly and effectively. The suspicion that McLaughlin was targeted because he often prosecuted gang members left others in related professions feeling vulnerable, “Calvin Wier, a criminal lawyer who lives on Dudley Street, said he held his head high as he walked past gang members in his neighborhood, assuming his job sheltered him from attack. I thought if I get killed in Roxbury, it’ll be by accident. Now here’s the possibility of a kid targeting someone because of his position”⁴⁵. With these fears in mind, the law enforcement community made it a priority to mount a quick and effective response to this incident.

Due to the sensitive circumstances of the crime, leaders in Boston’s African-American community felt that they must establish an immediate position and approach to the incident. The day after it occurred, the executive committee of the Ten-Point Coalition publicly condemned the murder of the Assistant Attorney General at a press conference. They expressed concern for the McLaughlin family and placed strong emphasis on bringing the city together to avoid the threat of polarization: “‘We ask the city as a whole to step back and not allow their conscious or unconscious fears to drive what happens,’ Rev. Hammond said, ‘This is a time for the city of Boston to come

together and to make it clear that we will not be held hostage by either perpetrators of violence or by those who would exploit the fear of violence to promote more racial division.”⁴⁶ Reverend Eugene Rivers cited this press conference as critical in preventing what he termed an “open season on black youth,” which he believes did occur during the Carol Stuart murder case. Ten-Point ministers also forcefully advocated an aggressive, but fair, investigation of the murder: “Thus we wholeheartedly support all legal efforts to apprehend the perpetrators of this brutal crime.”⁴⁷

The strong stance immediately taken by leaders in the African-American religious community accomplished several objectives. First, it emphasized that even a community with historically antagonistic feelings towards law enforcement officials would not tolerate retaliation attacks against the law enforcement professionals. The clergy group made it clear that the history of police abuse of African-Americans would not in any way justify such a murder. This stance from the clergy sent a message to Boston’s African-American community as well as the (primarily white) law enforcement community, that African-American youth could not interpret the murder as some kind of justifiable defense of their neighborhood. At the same time, the statement pledging their support for a fair police effort publicly clarified that police aggression or harassment was neither necessary or acceptable. Therefore, the press conference removed cause or justification for aggression from either side.

Another major accomplishment of the immediate response from Ten-Point was to

prevent the damaging influence of the media. Many newspaper articles compared the McLaughlin murder to the Stuart case, and the media was poised to report another botched investigation. However, according to one police officer who witnessed both investigations first hand, media influence was much less in the McLaughlin case. The ministers' press conference made it possible for the gang unit to investigate the murder without their actions "being misconstrued as being other than what they were, we were not followed by T.V. cameras as in the Charles Stuart murder." By taking a stand in support of police action, the black clergy made the media less prone to exaggerate or aggravate the tense situation.

The ministers' stance also indicated that a group that had been highly critical of the Boston Police Department in the past now believed that the Department had made significant improvements. According to one police source, by the time of the McLaughlin murder, the "clergy viewed them (the police) as a much different police force," and were confident that the department would carry out a "professional investigation." Therefore, the statement made by the clergy was not simply a political maneuver designed to avoid a racial conflict or keep their neighborhoods safe from the threat of police aggression. Clergy representatives are adamant about the fact that they did not suddenly decide to brush aside incidents of abuse in favor of maintaining community order. There was a profound "attitudinal change" behind their resolution to allow the police force to conduct the investigation without voicing opposition. The leaders of the black community felt that

there had been a fundamental change in police practices that enabled these former critics to “back the case”, according to law enforcement officials and ministers involved in the case.

The tactics and investigative approach demonstrated by Boston’s law enforcement officials during this tense period showed marked improvement from the time of the Stuart murder. Both clergy and police representatives were very sensitive to the delicate implications of a racially charged case. Police Commissioner Paul F. Evans immediately made a statement to address community fears about a repeat of the chaos that surrounded the Stuart investigation, “I’m concerned about the potential for this limited description (of the assailant) to become divisive. We’re not going to let that happen. This will be a professional investigation.”⁴⁸ The Commissioner spoke on a radio station with a largely black audience soon after the murder to emphasize the limited value of the vague assailant description, and to say that an effective investigation depended on cooperation between the police and the community. The Commissioner also joined the ministers at the Ten-Point Coalition’s press conference in an additional illustration of police cooperation, rather than antagonism, with the African-American community.

These actions could have been taken as mere political safeguarding on the part of the Police Commissioner if street-level police officers had not demonstrated equally sensitive investigative tactics. The Ten-Point ministers serve as community advocates, often accompanying youthful offenders to their court appearances, so their statement that

“they have heard of no ‘indiscriminate conduct’ by police accosting black youths”⁴⁹ during the McLaughlin investigation carried a lot of weight. The approaches taken by both law enforcement and black clergy to the handling of the McLaughlin murder illustrate the dramatic shifts that occurred in the relationship between those two groups since the late 1980s and early 1990s. In early 1998, a special grand jury indicted Jeffrey “Black” Bly for the murder of Paul R. McLaughlin. Bly was a notorious “gang banger” who was tried three times by McLaughlin, and sources that know Bly claim he was convinced that McLaughlin was on a “vendetta against him.”⁵⁰ This led him to make repeated attempts to intimidate the attorney at the courthouse and most likely served as his rationale for executing the prosecutor.

Conclusion

In this paper we argue that police ultimately cannot be efficacious in a community that does not view their activities as legitimate. Our argument, however, goes further. We suggest that over the long run it is difficult if not impossible for police activity in the inner city to be successful unless it is seen as legitimate and supported by local residents.

We have argued that police work dealing with youth violence is inherently problematic. Communities want safe streets but they also want their kids to stay out of jail. Difficult choices need to be made that are likely to be seen as unjust by some subset of residents. In this environment, it is difficult to establish legitimacy for police actions, no matter what those actions are.

Our claim is that in Boston the Ten-Point Coalition has evolved into an institution that has at least partially ameliorated this dilemma. By supporting police activity that the Coalition believes is beneficial to the community and being critical of activities that are not, they have created what we have called an umbrella of legitimacy for police to work under. This in turn has allowed the police to effectively deal with youth violence by pursuing a focused strategy targeting the truly dangerous youth. It is our argument that this situation, which is far different from most major cities, has significantly contributed to the spectacular drop in homicide rates observed in Boston.

Our analysis provides a particular interpretation of what has happened in Boston. If it is correct, it suggests that police need to create a strong community of partners. These partnerships involve both a cooperative effort to deal with youth violence and a delineation of what constitutes legitimate police behavior. Police strategies can only acquire true legitimacy within inner city communities if the community partner is willing to both support police tactics when they are appropriate and provide harsh, public criticism of activities that are not. In this role, churches and ministers are ideal partners.

It should be remembered that the goal of our research was to establish the plausibility of the claim that the Ten-Point Coalition had made a critical contribution to the dramatic reductions in homicide exhibited in Boston during the 1990s. Further, we have argued that their primary contribution to Boston's success has not been due to their street ministry, that is, the attempt to turn kids around through one-on-one counseling, or the

ministry of others. Rather, we have argued that the Ten-Point Coalition has been important because of the role it has played in both controlling and legitimizing police activity. In addition, we have argued that the Ten-Point Coalition may play an important remote surveillance role that has increased police effectiveness.

We hope that the reader will agree that the plausibility of Ten-Point's importance has been established. Our paper, however, leaves many questions unanswered. More strategic research is needed to uncover what facets of the ministers' work have been most important. Furthermore, we do not know exactly how the three core ministers have come to obtain the power and standing they enjoy in the Boston community. If it is simply their charisma that has been critical, it may be difficult to replicate the Ten-Point Program in other cities. More generally, there is the question of why homicide rates have dropped in some cities as opposed to others. Until we have a good understanding of what factors overall have been important in reducing homicide rates in Boston and elsewhere, it will be impossible to precisely determine the full extent of Ten-Point's contribution in Boston.

Only the future can determine whether our interpretation of the Boston story is correct. Proof or disproof of our assertions will emerge as Boston's partnership-based strategy is put to the test across the nation. The question will be answered when implementation of the strategy in other cities either produces or fails to produce substantial long-term reductions in youth homicide rates. The possibility that Boston has found an effective strategy for reducing youth violence without severely and broadly

compromising the civil liberties of its inner city residents is exciting.

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Appendix A

Historical Time Line

Historical Developments		Homicide Rates ⁵¹
Police Commissioner Mickey Roache urges policy of denial of "gang problem"	1987	25 Youth Homicides*, 76 Overall
*CWACU permanently assigned to triangular area of Dorchester, Roxbury and Mattapan	1988	29 Youth Homicides, 93 Overall
Police department issues statement that "if in gang, will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law" Police Department accused of "Stop and Frisk" tactics Carol Stuart Murder	1989	60 Youth Homicides, 99 Overall
Peak year for Boston homicides at 152 Judge rules to throw out evidence due to unconstitutional policing tactics CWACU disbanded and reorganized in form of **AGVU	1990	59 Youth Homicides, 152 Overall
Boston Globe prints four part series criticizing Boston Police St. Clair Commission appointed to determine effectiveness of Boston policing tactics Shooting at Reverend Rivers' home	1991	28 Youth Homicides, 103 Overall
Ten-Point Coalition formed May, 1992, Morning Star Baptist Church shooting Police Practices Coalition created as community organized police monitoring group People's Tribunal, youth leadership awards event held in Boston to honor "good cops" November, 1992, first Nightlight outing Youth Violence Strike Force created	1992	39 Youth Homicides, 73 Overall
Operation Scrap-Iron Police Department's area warrant sweep tactics begun in Boston	1993	43 Youth Homicides, 98 Overall
Operation Cease-fire begins	1994	33 Youth Homicides, 85 Overall
Cox Case McLaughlin murder and investigation	1995	41 Youth Homicides, 96 Overall
	1996	13 Youth Homicides, 59 Overall
	1997	43 Overall
Drug bust at Bromley-Heath Housing Project	1998	35 Overall
*CWACU: City Wide Anti Crime Unit **AGVU: Anti-Gang Violence Unit		*Youth Ages 24 and under

Appendix B

Big City Homicide Rates

Change in U.S. City Homicide Rates: 1990-1996⁵²

	1990 Population	1990 Homicide Number	1990 Homicide Rate	1996 Population	1996 Homicide Number	1996 Homicide Rate	% Change Homicide Rate 90-96
Boston	552,519	152	27.5	552,519	59	10.7	-58.7%
New York	7,322,564	2,245	30.7	7,339,594	986	13.4	-56.1%
Houston	1,630,553	568	34.8	1,772,143	261	14.7	-54.0%
Dallas	1,006,877	447	44.4	1,060,585	217	20.5	-51.5%
San Antonio	935,933	208	22.2	1,021,477	117	11.5	-43.8%
San Diego	1,110,549	135	12.2	1,168,364	79	6.8	-41.5%
Los Angeles	3,485,398	983	28.2	3,498,139	709	20.3	-27.9%
Detroit	1,027,901	582	56.6	1,002,299	428	42.7	-26.5%
San Francisco	723,959	101	14.0	745,127	83	11.1	-17.8%
Philadelphia	1,585,577	503	31.7	1,528,403	414	27.1	-17.7%
Memphis	610,337	195	32.0	631,626	163	25.8	-16.4%
Washington DC	606,900	472	77.8	543,000	397	73.1	-15.9%
Chicago	2,783,726	851	30.6	2,721,547	789	28.6	-7.3%
Baltimore	736,014	305	41.4	716,446	328	45.8	7.5%
San Jose	782,248	35	4.5	830,374	40	4.8	14.3%
Phoenix	983,403	128	13.0	1,139,793	186	16.3	45.3%
Las Vegas	616,243	79	12.8	831,303	161	19.4	103.8%

Endnotes

¹ Philip J. Cook and John H. Laub, "The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence," *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, v. 24, 1998, The University of Chicago.

² Many cities where there have been declines have implemented community policing programs. These efforts typically try to be proactive rather than reactive in dealing with crime. Future research is needed to determine how important these new efforts might be in explaining differences across cities in the drop of homicide rates.

³ Daniel Vasquez, "Statistics Buoy City, But Not Victims' Kin," *The Boston Globe*, January 2, 1999.

⁴ Radin, Charles. *The Boston Globe*, February 19, 1997, p. A1.

⁵ David Kennedy, "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention," *Valparaiso University Law Review*, v. 31, n.2, Spring 1997, p. 449; "Kids, Guns, and Public Policy," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, v. 59, n. 1, Winter 1996, p. 147; "The (Un)known Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston," Working Paper, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1996.

⁶ The most significant publicity that The Ten-Point Coalition has received was in *Newsweek*. In the June, 1998 issue the Coalition's work is the feature story and Reverend

Eugene Rivers' picture is on the front cover. The Ten-Point Coalition has also been the focus of a PBS documentary, *Time Magazine* (July 21, 1997 v. 150 n. 3), *Sojourners Magazine*, *Impact Magazine*, the *Weekly Standard*, and several national newspapers such as the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, the *New York Times*, and frequently in the *Boston Globe*.

⁷ Other Boston ministers, such as Reverends Bruce Wall and Michael Haynes, fellow

members of the Boston Ten-Point Coalition, have also been engaged in intensive street ministry's during the past decade. However, as we discuss later in the paper, Reverends Rivers, Hammond, and Brown have been the key actors in establishing a partnership with the police and publically establishing the legitimacy of their activities. As in other cities, there are many other groups in Boston involved in working with at risk youth. Prominent examples are the Dorchester Youth Collaborative and the Boston Violence Prevention Program. Although these programs have almost certainly positively contributed to the dramatic reductions in crime we have seen in Boston, we believe that their direct impact on the overall homicide rate through one on one counseling of street youth, as that of the three Ten Point ministers, has been modest.

⁹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1991-1992.

¹⁰ Globe Staff, "St. Clair Report; Events Leading to St. Clair Report," *The Boston Globe*, January 15, 1992, p. 23.

¹¹ The question of causality and timing here are complex. The most aggressive period of stop and frisk tactics stopped in 1990. Yet the homicide rate continued to fall in 1991 and 1992. If one believes that the causal connection is contemporaneous, then this is evidence of a lack of a causal effect. However, if the causal effect of police enforcement is lagged, then this is evidence for a causal effect.

¹² From conversation with David Kennedy, October 1997.

¹³ A more extensive discussion of Operation Night Light is provided in Ron Corbett's essay, which is included in this volume.

¹⁴ David Kennedy, "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime settings, and a Theory of Prevention," *Valparaiso University Law Review*, v. 31, n. 2, Spring 1997, p. 449.

¹⁵ See note 11.

¹⁶ Jenny Berrien, “The Boston Miracle: The Emergence of New Institutional Structures in the Absence of Rational Planning,” Harvard University Department of Sociology Senior Thesis, March 20, 1998.

¹⁷ These pastors serve different types of congregations and have very personal styles. Reverend Rivers is the pastor of the Azusa Christian Community with a congregation of around 40 members that mostly live within the Four Corners neighborhood of Dorchester. He is sometimes accused of running a “store-front church” because of the surprisingly small congregation. Rivers also tends to be the most politically outspoken and controversial of the three ministers. Reverend Hammond oversees the Bethel AME church in Dorchester, a much more populous church that attracts people from a variety of neighborhoods to its congregation. Hammond is described as less controversial than Rivers, but equally strong in his convictions and drive for social change. Jeffrey Brown is the Reverend at the Union Baptist Church in Cambridge. Brown’s congregation has several hundred parishioners, but like Rivers, he remains very active in street-based outreach. Brown is sometimes referred to as the “most mature” of the three because he seems able to further his own objectives while maintaining congenial relationships with everyone involved.

¹⁸ Robert A. Jordan and Globe Staff, "Clergy's Anger Can Bring Hope," *The Boston Globe*, May 16, 1992, p. 13.

¹⁹ See note 13.

²⁰ Randall Kennedy, *Race, Crime, and the Law*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997).

²¹ Paul Butler, "Racially Based Jury Nullification Black Power in the Criminal Justice

System,” *Yale Law Journal*, n. 236, 1995, p. 724-725, as cited in *Race, Crime, and the Law*, see note 17.

²² See Mary E. Patillo, “Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers: Managing Crime in a Black Middle-Class Neighborhood,” *Social Forces*, v. 75, n. 3, March 1998, p. 747-74 for a relevant account.

²³ Trent T. Gegax and Evan Thomas, “A Poverty Pioneer’s Woes,” *Newsweek*, December 7, 1998, p. 36.

²¹ See note 20.

²⁵ Currently, Giuliani continues to have tremendous city-wide support. We, therefore, may need to temper our argument to recognize his continued political popularity. His heavy-handed tactical agenda and lack of support from any intermediary institution within the city’s black community will only be problematic and become unsustainable in the case that his political backing begins to deteriorate.

²⁷ See note 20.

²⁸ Clifford Krauss, “New York’s Violent Crime Rate Drops to Lows of Early 1970’s,” *The New York Times*, December 31, 1995, section 1, p. 1.

²⁹ See note 22.

³⁰ See note 16.

³¹ See note 20.

³² Dan Barry, "Butts, Harlem's Prominent Pastor, Calls Giuliani a Racist," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1998, p. B1.

³³ See note 26.

³⁴ See note 26.

³⁵ Barbara Ross, "Dirty 30 Sergeant Gives Prison Term," *Daily News (New York)*, June 17, 1997, p. 10.

³⁶ Associated Press, "Protesters Rage/Demand Feds probe police brutality," *Newsday (New York)*, September 13, 1997.

³⁷ Merle English, "Leaders Fault Mayor for Melee," *Newsday*, September 7, 1998, p. A3.

³⁸ See note 15.

³⁹ This is not to say that Ten-Point is universally seen as the legitimate representative of the black community within Boston. There have been numerous conflicts between, Ten-Point, particularly Reverend Rivers, and other representatives of the Boston black community.

⁴⁰ See note 11.

⁴¹ Some readers have been concerned that the ministers' role in identifying troublesome youth may allot them too much power. This is a legitimate fear. However, the Ten-Point Coalition's own standing in Boston is quite fragile; they have their enemies and vocal

critics. As a result, it would be difficult for them to abuse their power without consequence. There are plenty of prominent figures that would be delighted to publicly attack them and undermine their credibility.

⁴² An important piece of research that has not been carried out is to interview a broad section of community residents to see if the activities and decisions that are made collaboratively by police and Ten-Point are seen as just and fair. At this point, our claim is

only based on the fact that there has not been any public outcry over these activities either in the *Boston Globe* or *Herald* or the local African-American newspaper, the *Banner*.

⁴³ Chacon, "Profile of Gunman Fits Many Youths Say; Prosecutor's Slaying; The Search for a Suspect," *The Boston Globe*, September 27, 1995, p. 33.

⁴⁴ See note 36.

⁴⁵ Geeta Anand and Michael Grunwald, "Authorities are praised; some blacks wary," *The Boston Globe*, September 30, 1995, p. 80.

⁴⁶ See note 38.

⁴⁷ Ten-Point Coalition, "Black leaders speak out on slaying," *The Boston Globe*, September 30, 1995, Editorial, p. 12.

⁴⁸ See note 36.

⁴⁹ See note 36.

⁴⁷ Sean Flynn, "Public Enemy," *Boston Magazine*, May 1998.

⁴⁸ Youth Homicide Numbers: David Kennedy, See note 12. Overall Homicide Numbers: Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1987-1998.

⁴⁹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1991-1992 and Precision Journalism, <http://www.crunch.com>, "Big City Murder Rates: 1996 Preliminary FBI Crime Statistics."